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Abstract

As computers become larger, more powerful, and more connected, many challenges arise
in implementing and maintaining a secure computing environment. Some of the challenges come
from the exponential increase of unstructured messages generated by the computer systems and
applications. Although these data contain a wealth of information that is useful for advanced threat
detection and prediction for future anomalies, the sheer volume, variety, and complexity of data
make it difficult for even well-trained analysts to extract the right information. While conventional
SIEM (Security Information and Event Management) tools provide some capability to collect,
correlate, and detect certain events from structured messages, their rule-based correlation and
detection algorithms fall short in utilizing information in unstructured messages. This study
explores the possibility of utilizing techniques for text mining, natural language processing, and
machine learning to detect security threat by extracting relevant information from various
unstructured log messages collected from distributed non-homogeneous systems. The extracted
features are used to run a number of experiments on the Packet Clearing House SKAION 2006
IARPA Dataset, and the performance of prediction is evaluated. In comparison to the base case
without feature extraction, an average of 16.73% of accumulated performance gain and 84% of
time reduction was achieved using extracted features only, while a 23.48% performance gain with
82.39% of time increase was attained using both unstructured free-text messages and extracted
features. The results display strong potential for further increase in performance by using larger
size of training sets and extracting more features from the unstructured log messages.
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Chapter 1. Introduction

Security Information and Event Management (SIEM)
The term Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) is fairly generic, and
seemingly referencing any technology or practice that aims to manage any information and events
related to information security. However, in our current security technology landscape, this term
commonly refers to one specific type of technology whose main functions are to collect, store,
search and correlate system-generated log messages. System-generated log messages here refer to
the messages generated by a machine in a human-readable format, in order to support maintenance,
trouble-shooting, surveillance, or audit activities.
The functions of SIEM become essential in an architecture where applications are
distributed among many specialized devices. In the architecture of the earlier computing era, where
there was one central computer and many consoles connected to it, almost all important messages
were logged centrally and the administrator could easily find all the sequences of transactions in
one log repository in that central computer. However, this is not the case in most computing
environments today. For example, to support one small commercial web application, we usually
provision at minimum two webservers, one to two application server(s), and two database servers
for redundancy and load balancing. Besides servers, there would be a few desktops or laptops and
wireless devices connected to the system, along with several switches, firewalls, and routers to
connect them all. If all these devices generated logs that are meant to be used for support,
maintenance, security, or audit, and stored them locally, we can easily see the inefficiencies
involved with accessing each device individually and digging for the right information. We can
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also imagine what it might be like to run a few hundreds or thousands of devices connected in a
large computing environment.
The amount of messages generated is also an important justification for SIEM. The devices
in our connected environment today tend to be small but very chatty, because many applications
running on these devices need to log additional inter-device communications. This log verbosity
could be adjusted for some logs, but not all. For example, many financial transaction logs are
required to be generated at a level that can provide complete audit traces of an auditable transaction
and must be stored for many years for compliance reasons. With limited memory and storage in
these devices, it makes sense to store only small portions of recent logs locally and send the
majority to a central location for storage and archiving.
The most popular justification for SIEM has to do with the concept of correlating logs that
are collected from many dispersed devices in order to detect events that are normally unnoticeable
if each log is checked separately. This is the reason SIEM has “Security” in its name, rather than
being called a simple log management system. This function is a powerful tool in a securitysensitive context, where an adversary often “moves around” different devices attempting to gain
unauthorized access in multiple different ways or compromises a series of devices in order to reach
a target.
Figure 1 shows the typical SIEM architecture, where the remote log collectors or local log
agents collect logs and send them to a central log repository. The log search and correlation engine
provides search, correlation, detection, alert services for the administrator/operator.
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[Listing 1] Windows Event Log Entry - Example
[Figure 1] SIEM Architecture - Example

Limitations of Current SIEM Technology
Although event detection is the most unique and powerful function of SIEM systems for
security [27], in many cases, it is largely under-utilized [39]. The most obvious cause for this lack
of implementation is the high cost associated with utilizing correlation and detection features with
sufficiently high accuracy and specificity for security operations. This high cost is caused by
indirect causes such as complexity and inflexibility of rule-based detection strategies, and
deterministic parsing schemes in which only certain logs that follow a specific logging protocol
are understood.
The complexity of detection rules stems from the rule-based correlation/detection strategy
employed by most traditional SIEM systems. The correlation/detection rules are pre-configured
based on knowledge of previous attacks and their log traces. We will illustrate this through the
following example: One very common rule accompanying most SIEM systems is “to create an
3

alert if there is a successful login after some number of consecutive failed login attempts.” This
rule is intended to detect a password-guessing or brute-force attack and when active, triggers an
alarm for an operator to investigate further. The limit for failed login attempts, the time window
for “consecutiveness,” and some other parameters need to be configured by the administrator. This
sounds simple enough if we have a few machines in one location. But if we have a few thousand
machines across the globe that are used by people with a diverse range of technical abilities, this
problem becomes much more complex. First, we must decide which devices should have this rule
active and determine the number of average failed login attempts for normal usage on each of these
devices. Due to the fact that most organizations do not have this type of information on hand, the
system must first be run for a period of time using default values. During this tuning period, the
operator is required t to investigate each alert generated by this rule and label it as normal or
malicious. When this tuning period ends, all alerts generated by the rule must be analyzed,
thresholds must be adjusted, and the tuning process needs to be repeated. This tuning process is
not completed until nearly all alerts triggered by this rule are indeed malicious. If all this effort is
required for one rule, then we can imagine the effort required for a few hundred rules and the
thousands of alerts generated by them.
Another limitation of rule-based detection is the fact that it is not adaptable. As new threats
and attack tactics are discovered, SIEM rules also need to be updated to detect these new threats.
Unlike anti-viruses where the new signatures can be injected remotely to all instances, SIEM’s
rules are heavily dependent on the environment’s architecture and the applications existing within
it. For the rule “successful login after a number of unsuccessful attempts” in the previous example
to work, the device needed to run the Windows O/S and a member of a Windows domain. If we
want to correlate the rule with logs from Ubuntu Linux servers, then a number of custom rules
4

must be written. If we added a few more Solaris Linux servers into the environment, the custom
rules may need to be further re-written, tested and tuned. The larger the organization, the more
changes occur daily - new users are added, devices are removed, traffic is rerouted, and vendors
come and go. These changes require almost constant reconfiguration and adjustment of the SIEM
rules in order to maintain effective operations.
The second reason for the under-utilization of the log correlation functionality of SIEM is
deterministic parsing schemes. Parsing is the process by which SIEM systems read log entries and
populate databases, so that the database can then be queried by the rules. Since the parser needs
to understand different parts of log entries, a specific parser is used for a specific logging protocol.
Popular logging protocols such as SNMP, Syslog, or Windows Event Logs are processed through
SNMP parsers, Syslog parsers, etc. The contents of less common or less structured logs such as
many application logs are largely ignored and stored as free-text content with some meta-data only.
In order to parse an unstructured or uncommon log properly, a custom parser must be developed.
In order to use the data stored by the custom parser, new database structures, new queries, and/or
new correlation rules also need to be developed. The complexity and inflexibility of these
processes drive up the cost for fully utilizing the SIEM’s log correlation function.

Unstructured Messages and Hidden Information
Unstructured messages are free-text contents in log entries that are generated by software.
These are actual messages to the reader regarding the status of the program which were written by
the programmers and included as useful information for the users and administrators of the system.
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For example, in a Windows Event Log Entry message in Listing 1 below, the unstructured
message is the grey-highlighted portion starting from “The IP address...” It is not difficult to see
Error 3/10/2011 2:29:01 PM
Microsoft-Windows-Dhcp-Client 1002 Address
Configuration State Event
The IP address lease 10.18.25.108 for the
Network Card with network address 0x801934C9D8E9 has been denied by the DHCP
server 10.5.18.11 (The DHCP Server sent a DHCPNACK message).

[Listing 2] Windows Event Log Entry - Example

that this section contains vital information that is relevant to the error. The structured parts are
meta-data added by the Windows Event Log framework, such as “Error,” “3/10/2011 2:29:01 PM”
above. In most current SIEM implementations, the correlation/detection rules only utilize the
structured parts of the log entry such as the time, source, and event type, and ignore most
information stored in the unstructured message. This is due to the SIEM vendor’s preference to
develop rules that work out-of-box in almost all instances. If a rule uses only meta-data, it is almost
guaranteed to work with any logs using Windows Event Log facilities, which avoids the high cost
associated with customization.
This approach, however, puts a significant limitation on what we can do with the
information stored in the log for obvious reasons. In the given example, all we can work with is
the information that at 1:29:01 PM, the Microsoft-Windows-Dhcp-Client has an error with Event
ID 1002-Address Configuration State Event. We cannot use the information in the unstructured
part, such as the IP addresses, MAC addresses, or the error code from the DHCP Server.
The difficulty of parsing unstructured messages comes from the fact that they are at least
partially written in natural language. These phrases are formed by the human developers of the
program in order to communicate with the human users of the system. Therefore, the challenges
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regarding the automatic processing of logging messages also partially involve natural language
processing.

Research Objectives and Contributions
This research explores the possibility of harnessing recent developments in machine
learning in order to exploit the hidden information within unstructured messages to detect events.
This is to augment the limitations of current SIEM technology and the experiment results would
contribute the improvement of limitations mentioned above. For example, if the detection rules are
automatically generated through supervised or unsupervised learning and can be self-adjusted to
changes in the environment, then the time-consuming process of initial configuration and
subsequent updates can be minimized. Also, if there is a generic parser that can recognize and
understand key information in uncommon or unstructured logs through the techniques of text
mining and natural language processing, the task of custom parser development for such logs could
be reduced to the simple task of training the parser with the sample logs of the environment. These
two improvements, if properly implemented, would eliminate a large portion of manual coding
and tuning, resulting in increased accuracy and a reduced cost.
Moreover, we believe this approach has the benefit of pushing the limits of the traditional
SIEM by utilizing information that is currently ignored. We hope that the extra information will
not only improve the performance of SIEM, but also be able to detect events that were previously
impossible to notice due to a lack of information. There is also the potential to be able to detect
anomalies which were previously unseen by means of pattern recognition and auto-tuning.
Nevertheless, it should be emphasized that this study alone in no way resolves all the
problems and improvements discussed above, nor does it provide an alternative solution to the
7

current SIEM. This study is a preliminary step towards using machine learning in order to take
advantage of information that is already collected by SIEM and aims to gauge its feasibility and
future directions.

Similar Works
One early effort for unstructured log analysis was done by Qiang Fu et al. [1]. In this paper,
Fu et al. introduced an algorithm to detect execution anomalies through unstructured logs of
Hadoop and SILK. The main difference of this study from ours is that Fu et al. used regular
expression to extract specific “log keys” which are predefined based on specific applications. That
is, the information extractor already knows what to search for. On the other hand, our approach
focuses on extracting “all relevant information” for detection from any unstructured log using
natural language processing. This generality is the key concept of our research.
Wei Xu et. al also presented an application of using data mining and statistical learning
methods to detect abnormal execution traces from console logs [2]. In this paper, the authors
present the method of using frequent pattern mining and distribution estimation techniques to
discover a dominant pattern, and then, use principal component analysis for anomaly detection.
An unusual approach of this work is that the authors suggested the analysis of source code to
eliminate the uncertainty inherent in parsing application logs. Although this method will give
highly accurate results in unstructured log analysis, it is not easily adopted to general cases where
the log analyzer does not have access to the source code.
Azodi et al. presents a method to improve IDS/SIEM performance by detecting the input
log type and format using regular expression and normalizing log entries [3]. The philosophy
behind this approach is very similar to ours. The difference is that their normalized logs are still
8

fed into rule-based detection, whereas we are exploring the use of machine-learning detection, in
a more concerted effort towards a generic parser and detector.
Many other studies related to more specific topics are discussed in the different sections of
this report.
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Chapter 2. SKAION 2006 IARPA Dataset

Description
The dataset used for the experiments is from the Packet Clearing House SKAION 2006
IARPA Dataset1 [4, 5]. This dataset consists of various logs and network traces captured from a
simulated network environment, where benign user activities and malicious attacks are emulated
by computer programs [4]. The malicious attacks are of various levels of sophistication ranging
from a simple CGI Overflow to attacks involving email phishing [5]. The dataset also includes
data related to the normal level of background activities, including probing and unsuccessful attack
attempts. The distribution of these background activities are statistically modeled after the traffic
observed at the Air Force Research Laboratory [4].
The total size of the dataset is 119.2 TB, and a large portion of it contains network traffic
traces. For this research, approximately 15 GB of text data from release 4 is used. The data for this
study consists mainly of logs collected from 136 sources for different attack scenarios and
background traffic. Listings 2-6 are examples of raw logs (IP addresses are replaced with random
strings).
Thu Sep 22 14:27:41 2005 1 XXX.XXX.XXX.XXX 18 495489
/var/ftp/ftp.sgc.osis.gov/pub/foia/txt/ERKS.pdf b _ o a res@XXX.XXX.XXX.XXX ftp 0 * c
Thu Sep 22 14:28:16 2005 1 XXX.XXX.XXX.XXX 495489
/var/ftp/ftp.sgc.osis.gov/pub/foia/txt/ERKS.pdf b _ o a res@XXX.XXX.XXX.XXX ftp 0 * c
Thu Sep 22 14:28:54 2005 1 XXX.XXX.XXX.XXX 1491
/var/ftp/ftp.sgc.osis.gov/pub/foia/graphics/stars.jpg b _ o a res@XXX.XXX.XXX.XXX ftp 0 * c

[Listing 3] FTP Log

1

Support for the Packet Clearing House SKAION 2006 IARPA Dataset is provided by the U.S. Department of
Homeland Security, Science and Technology Directorate, PREDICT project.
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Sep
Sep
Sep
Sep
Sep
Sep
Sep

22
22
22
22
22
22
22

15:05:51
15:05:51
15:06:23
15:06:23
15:06:27
15:06:27
15:06:31

www kernel: NETDEV WATCHDOG: eth1: transmit
www kernel: eth1: Transmit timed out, status
www kernel: NETDEV WATCHDOG: eth1: transmit
www kernel: eth1: Transmit timed out, status
www kernel: NETDEV WATCHDOG: eth1: transmit
www kernel: eth1: Transmit timed out, status
www kernel: NETDEV WATCHDOG: eth1: transmit

timed out
0000, PHY status 786d, resetting...
timed out
0000, PHY status 786d, res etting...
timed out
0000, PHY status 786d, resetting...
timed out

[Listing 4] UNIX Log
XXX.XXX.XXX.XXX - - [22/Sep/2005:14:39:41 -0400] "GET / HTTP/1.1" 304 - "-" "Mozilla/4.0
(compatible; MSIE 5.01; Windows NT 5.0)"
XXX.XXX.XXX.XXX - - [22/Sep/2005:14:40:32 -0400] "GET /180.html HTTP/1.1" 200 3558 "-" "TGS Web
Bot"
XXX.XXX.XXX.XXX - - [22/Sep/2005:14:40:32 -0400] "GET /0010.jpg HTTP/1.1" 200 5310 "-" "TGS Web
Bot"
XXX.XXX.XXX.XXX - - [22/Sep/2005:14:45:41 -0400] "GET /100.html HTTP/1.1" 200 3004 "-"
"Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 5.01; Windows NT 5.0)"
XXX.XXX.XXX.XXX - - [22/Sep/2005:14:45:55 -0400] "GET /1320.html HTTP/1.1" 200 3054 "-" "TGS
Web Bot"
XXX.XXX.XXX.XXX - - [22/Sep/2005:14:45:55 -0400] "GET /0044.jpg HTTP/1.1" 200 4249 "-" "TGS Web
Bot"

[Listing 4] Web Access Log
8/6/2005
4:57:00 AM
4
0
420
NNTPSVC N/A
HOST23 Pickup
Directory
Status Report.
In the last 60 minutes, the pickup directory for
virtual server 1 has
successfully received 0 articles.
8/6/2005
5:36:26 AM
2
0
8021
BROWSER N/A
HOST23 The
browser
was
unable to retrieve a list of servers from the browser master \\OSIRIS on the network
\Device\NetBT_Tcpip_{78BEE437-352C-477E-9372-546DF7B52119}. The data is the error code.
8/6/2005
5:57:00 AM
4
0
421
NNTPSVC N/A
HOST23 Post Status Report.
In the last 60 minutes, the virtual server 1
has successfully received 0 posts.
8/6/2005
5:57:00 AM
4
0
420
NNTPSVC N/A
HOST23 Pickup
Directory
Status Report.
In the last 60 minutes, the pickup directory for
vi rtual server 1 has
successfully received 0 articles.
8/6/2005
6:52:39 AM
2
0
8021
BROWSER N/A
HOST23 The
browser
was
unable to retrieve a list of servers from the browser master \\ HOST23 on the network
\Device\NetBT_Tcpip_{78BEE437-352C-477E-9372-546DF7B52119}. The data is the error code.
8/6/2005
6:57:00 AM
4
0
421
NNTPSVC N/A
C-HOST3 Post Status Report.
In the last 60 minutes, the virtual server 1
has successfully received 0 posts.

[Listing 5] Windows Log

[**] [104:3:1] Spade: Non-live dest used: local dest, est. flags: 1.0000 [**]
09/22-14:26:20.871503 XXX.XXX.XXX.XXX:52734 -> YYY.YYY.YYY.YYY:80
TCP TTL:114 TOS:0x0 ID:37695 IpLen:20 DgmLen:40
***A**** Seq: 0x23BFAB1E Ack: 0xC0FFAB1E Win: 0x400 TcpLen: 20
[**] [104:3:1] Spade: Non-live dest used: non-err icmp, local dest: 1.0000 [**]
09/22-14:26:26.885387 XXX.XXX.XXX.XXX -> YYY.YYY.YYY.YYY
ICMP TTL:114 TOS:0x0 ID:33547 IpLen:20 DgmLen:28
Type:8 Code:0 ID:63603
Seq:44542 ECHO

[Listing 6] Snort Alert
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Attack Scenarios
Release 4 includes data from ten different attack scenarios. Since the logs included for each
scenario are not consistent for all scenarios, only the following five shown in Table 1 were included
in this study.

Attack ID

Background
Attack Scale

Scenario

Description

4s1

CGI Overflow

50%

Attacker passes an overflow string to a
CGI script on webserver

4s3

CGI Overflow
with Decoys

50%

Same as 4s1, but there are many decoys
that produce the same footprints in IDS
before and after the attack

50%

Attack involves a Word document with a
malicious macro sent through email. The
macro is activated by one user and
uploads all files in the “Recent Files” list
to a remote ftp server

None

An administrator accidentally brings
down the firewall, allowing
unauthorized traffic to get through to the
internal network for a couple of minutes

None

A user is lured to register a malicious
website and he uses the same
username/password to the Windows
machine on the network. The attacker
ssh to the Windows machine and
downloads a PNP exploit executable,
gaining a command shell. The attacker
then uploads all files to a remote ftp site.

4s4

Word Macro
Exfiltration

4s13

Firewall
Misconfiguration

4s14

Phishing and PNP

[Table 1] Attack Scenarios [4]

Attacks 4s1, 4s3 and 4s4 have a background attack scale of 50%, which means that similar
attempts were observed and recorded in background data. This will make it harder to distinguish
the alerts and log entries of these three attacks from that of background data. Also, 4s3 involves
decoy attacks which produce the same footprints in the intrusion detection system (IDS).
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Chapter 3. Text Classification of SKAION Log Messages

Log Classification and Threat Detection
The problem of detecting malicious activities using unstructured log messages can be seen
as a problem of text classification. If we have a classifier that can determine with reasonable
accuracy whether a given log message is from normal data or intrusion data, then we can assume
that the same classifier can predict the class of an unseen future log entry as well. To build such a
classifier, we would need to extract the right information from the logs and feed them into the right
classification algorithm.
There have been many previous studies on text classification of standard natural language
corpus [20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25], scanned OCR documents [28, 29], and social media data [30, 31,
32, 33]. System-generated messages, however, have a few different characteristics to the natural
language text that was analyzed extensively in the aforementioned studies. Some of these
characteristics are:


A large portion of the message is repeated many times in a set of log entries



The number of natural language words used in the text are relatively small



Actual vocabulary size is large since log messages contain a large number of tokens
that are not words, but numbers or codes, such as the name of executables, status
codes, and error codes. Some are in binary, octal, or hexadecimal number formats.



The messages may not follow standard grammar rules
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Therefore, a careful examination is required in selecting the right algorithms and features
for the classification of machine-generated unstructured messages. With these differences in mind,
we approached this study through the following three steps:
1) Apply different classification algorithms on message text and measure the performance
of each algorithm. This will help determine which algorithm performs well for this task
and establish a baseline performance.
2) Identify features that may be useful for classification and extract those features from
the unstructured message. Repeat the same experiments as in (1) using a) the extracted
features only, and b) both features and the message together.
3) Analyze the results to determine which features and algorithms perform well in
problems of threat detection using unstructured log analytics.

Classification Algorithms
Since text can be modeled as quantitative data with word frequencies, (we will see how
this is done in detail in Section 3.3), a wide variety of classification algorithms developed for
numerical or categorical data can also be applied to text classification. However, the high
dimensionality and sparsity characteristics of text data makes certain algorithms more suitable for
text data [13]. Among the common classification algorithms surveyed by different researchers [13,
14, 15] for text classification, three classification algorithms, the Naïve Bayes Multinomial (NBM),
Support Vector Machine (SVM), and Random Forest (RF) generally performed better in terms of
accuracy, precision and speed on the SKAION dataset (Section 5.3) The following sections briefly
describes the inner workings of these algorithms.
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Naïve Bayes Multinomial (NBM)
The Naïve Bayes is a probabilistic classifier
that models the distribution of the documents in each
class using a model based on independence
assumptions about the distributions of different
terms. Essentially, it computes the posterior

[Figure 2] Hyperplanes separating two
classes [13]

probability of a class based on the distribution of the
words in the document and ignores the actual position of these words [13]. The Bayes Multinomial
Model captures the frequencies of terms in a document and calculates the conditional probability
that the document D is from class 𝑐𝑖 , using Bayes rule:

𝑃(𝐶 𝐷 = 𝑐𝑖 | 𝐷 = (𝑇, 𝐹 )) =

𝑃(𝐶 𝐷=𝑐𝑖 )∗𝑃(𝐷=(𝑇,𝐹) | 𝐶 𝐷=𝑐𝑖 )
𝑃(𝐷=(𝑇,𝐹))

(Eq. 3.5.1.1)

≊ 𝑃(𝐶 𝐷 = 𝑐𝑖 ) ∗ 𝑃(𝐷 = (𝑇, 𝐹 ) | 𝐶 𝐷 = 𝑐𝑖 ),
[Figure 3] Hyperplanes separating two
classes [13]

𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑇 = 𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝐷, 𝐹 = 𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑇 𝑖𝑛 𝐷.

and,
|𝐷|!

𝑃(𝐷 = (𝑇, 𝐹 ) | 𝐶 𝐷 = 𝑐𝑖 ) = ∏𝑚

𝑖=1 𝐹𝑖 !

∗ ∏𝑡𝑗 ∈𝑇 𝑃(𝑡𝑗 ∈ 𝐷 | 𝐶 𝐷 = 𝑐𝑖 )𝐹𝑗 .

(Eq. 3.5.1.2)

Compared to the multi-variate Bernoulli model, another model in the Naïve Bayes
classifier family, the Multinomial model, is known to work well with data of a large vocabulary
size [13].
Support Vector Machine (SVM)
The main principle of SVM is to determine the separators in the search space which can
best separate the different classes. In Figure 2, there are three hyperplanes separating two classes,
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represented by x and o. It is clear that hyperplane A provides the best separation because the normal
distance of any of the data points from it is the largest. The separator which represents the
maximum margin of separation has the most discriminating power [13]. The advantage of the
SVM method for text classification is that it is robust to high dimensionality [15]. Although it is
not necessary to use a linear function for an SVM classifier [16], it is very often used in practice
for its simplicity [13].
Random Forest (RF)
The Random Forest is an ensemble classifier consisting of a collection of tree-structured
base classifiers. Let D be a set of documents, and Nf, features. The following algorithm builds a
Random Tree classifier [17]:
1. Generate k subsets of D { D1, D2, … Dk} by random sampling
2. For each dataset Dk, build a decision tree model by randomly sampling a subspace of
m dimension (m < Nf) from the features at each node. Compute all possible splits based
on those m features. The data partitions from the best split (e.g. the largest Gini measure)
are used to generate child nodes. Repeat until the stopping criterion is reached.
3. Combine k unpruned trees into a Random Forest ensemble and use the majority votes
among the trees to reach a classification decision.
The Random Forest ensemble method is known to increase the accuracy of single-decision
tree classifiers by returning a classification decision based on decisions from all decision trees [17].
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Text Transformation
In order to classify a log message using machine learning, the log message has to be
transformed into a numeric vector that can be used by classification algorithms. Without any
specific feature extraction, the message can be transformed into a word vector representation, [6]
where each log entry is represented as a vector of bits or integers that indicate whether the message
contains a specific word (a bit) or the frequency of occurrence of a word in the message (an integer).
In our experiments with the SKAION dataset using the WEKA machine learning tool [8], some
common text transformation techniques such as stemming, removing stop words, or using n-gram
features have no positive impact on the performance of the classifier with log messages. On the
other hand, TF-IDF transformation generally has a positive impact on classifier performance, as
long as it is used with appropriate attribute selection strategies. (Figure 3-7)
TF-IDF transformation is a common technique to compute the weighting of words. The TF-IDF
score of the word, j, in a document, d, is calculated with the following formula (Eq. 3.3.1 and Eq.
3.3.2) or some variation [8]. In our case, a document is a log entry and a word is any tokenized
string occurring in the set of log entries.
𝑇𝐹_𝐼𝐷𝐹 (𝑗, 𝑑 ) = 𝑇𝐹 (𝑗, 𝑑 ) ∗ 𝐼𝐷𝐹 (𝑗).

(Eq. 3.3.1)

𝑁

𝐼𝐷𝐹(𝑗) = log (𝐷𝐹(𝑗)) .

(Eq. 3.3.2)

𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒, N is the total number of documents, DF(j)is the number of documents containing the word j,
and TF(j, d)is the frequency of the word j in a document d.

In the experiment with SKAION log data, the average precision of the three classifiers
improves by 2.3-2.7% if TF-IDF measures are used with attribute selection (Figure 3,
message_with_tf-idf_and_ig versus message_no_tf-idf_no_select). A 0.23% increase in precision
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is observed when the TF-IDF measure is used with attribute selection based on Information Gain
(IG) compared to using attribute selection alone (Figure 3, message_with_tf-idf_and_ig versus
message_no_tf-idf_with_ig). The TF-IDF measure’s impact on classification performance is also
dependent on the classification algorithm. Figure 5-7 shows it has greater impact on the Naïve
Bayes Multinomial (NBM) and Random Tree (RT) algorithm than Support Vector Machine
(SVM). For NBM, using the TF-IDF measure increased precision and decreased recall (Figure 5,
message_with_tf-idf_and_ig versus message_no_tf-idf_with_ig), whereas the opposite effects are
observed for RT (Figure 7, message_with_tf-idf_and_ig versus message_no_tf-idf_with_ig). SVM
did not show significant changes in performance, based on the TF-IDF transformation (Figure 6).

Attribute Selection
Attribute Selection is a technique for reducing dimensionality by removing noninformative attributes selectively. Yang and Pederson report in their comparative study, that
attribute selections based on Information Gain and the chi-squared test are most effective for text
classification [9]. In our experiment with the SKAION dataset unstructured log analysis, both the
Information Gain attribute selection and chi-squared test increased the performance and reduced
the training and testing time by a similar level (Figures 3, 4).
Information Gain
Information Gain measures the number of bits of information obtained for category
prediction by knowing the presence or absence of a term in a document [9, 10] (a log entry in our
case). For a classification with m classes (𝑐𝑖…𝑚 ) the Information Gain of term t is defined to be [9,
11]:
𝐺 (𝑡) = − ∑𝑚
𝑖=1 𝑃(𝑐𝑖 ) ∗ log 𝑃 (𝑐𝑖 )
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+𝑃(𝑡) ∗ ∑𝑚
𝑖=1 𝑃(𝑐𝑖 |𝑡) ∗ log 𝑃 (𝑐𝑖 |𝑡 )
+𝑃(𝑡) ∗ ∑𝑚
𝑖=1 𝑃(𝑐𝑖 |𝑡) ∗ log 𝑃 (𝑐𝑖 |𝑡).

(Eq. 3.4.1)

For each unique term in a set of log messages, we can calculate Information Gain and select
only the terms that are above a pre-defined threshold.
Chi-squared Test
The Chi-squared statistic measures the dependency between a feature and the target and
can be compared to the chi-square distribution with one degree of freedom to judge extremeness
[9, 12]. Let 𝑡 be the term and 𝑐𝑖 be the class. Then the Term Goodness measure is defined to be [9]:

𝜒 2 (𝑡, 𝑐𝑖 ) =

𝑁[𝑃(𝑡,𝑐𝑖 )∗𝑃(𝑡, 𝑐𝑖 )−𝑃(𝑡,𝑐𝑖 )∗𝑃(𝑡,𝑐𝑖 )]
𝑃(𝑡)∗𝑃(𝑡)∗𝑃(𝑐𝑖 )∗𝑃(𝑐𝑖 )

2

,

(Eq. 3.4.2)

𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑁 𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑑𝑜𝑐𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠.

This value is zero when t and 𝑐𝑖 are independent. To select a feature, the chi-squared value
is calculated for each unique term and ranked. Figure 3 and 4 show the relative gain of time and
accuracy for a chi-test attribute selection (message_with_tf-idf_and_chi).

Experimental Results – Text Transformation and Attribute Selection
Figures 3-7 are the results of experiments with different combinations of TF-IDF
transformations and attribute selections on unstructured log messages from the SKAION dataset.
The sample includes 500 log samples from each attack type and the same number of logs from
background data. Three classifiers, NBM, SVM, RT, were used in order to gauge the impact to
different classifiers.
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Figure 3 shows the average performance of all three over five attack types. Overall, the
precision increased by 2.5% and recall decreased by 3.0% using TF-IDF measures with attribute
selection. A more significant impact on dimensionality reduction was observed in elapsed time for
training and testing. As shown in Figure 4, both IG (Information Gain) and the Chi-squared test
achieved about a 63% reduction in time. Time was measured by elapsed time for training the model
and 10-fold testing.
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[Figure 3] Average Performance Based on TF-IDF and Attribute Selection.
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[Figure 4] Average Time in ms for Training and testing (10 folds)
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[Figure 5] Average Performance - NBM
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[Figure 7] Average Performance - RT
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[Figure 6] Average Performance - SVM
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Chapter 4. Feature Extraction

SKAION Log Meta-data
Meta-data for a log message collected by SIEM typically consists of the time of collection,
source device, source application, collection agent ID, and other information related to the
collection and transfer of log entries to the central repository. Some meta-data, such as the source
device and application are important features in correlation and detection of security threats.
Conversely, collection time (the time at which the log entry is collected by the agent) is usually
used as a secondary time reference when generation time (time at which the log entry is generated
at the source) is not available.
The SKAION data is collected off-line using scripts and, thus includes little meta-data.
During aggregation and sampling of the log entries, the following meta-data (Table 2) are kept for
reference purposes. Only two of them: log source and message length, were used for classification.

Feature
file_name
line_number
message_length
log_source

Source
Full path of the raw log file
Line number of the log entry in the raw log file
Number of characters in message in its original format
Source device name concatenated by system, o/s or application
name

Used for Classification
No
No
Yes
Yes

[Table 2] SAKION Log Meta-data

Named Entity Recognition (NER)
Named entity recognition in natural language processing refers to the process of
recognizing (or tagging) a sequence of words in a text that are names of things, such as people and
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company names [18, 19]. In our context, we are interested in recognizing the things that can be
found in log messages that may help us to detect the security threats. For example, user name,
application name, host name, IP addresses, or any keywords indicating the status of the application
would be good indicators for log correlation and threat detection. In order to extract relevant
information from unstructured log messages, we first identified the category of things to be
recognized, and created the training data by manually tagging a set of sampled logs. Table 3
describes the entities of interest.

Entity

Used for
Classification

Description
Date or time: year, month, day, hour, minutes, second, pre/post fix (AM,
PM) or time zone
Any component of a program or system: o/s, application, session, function
name, etc.
User name, email address or other string containing user name
Host name, computer name or IP address
Words indicating the state or event: success, error, completed, started, failed,
etc.

TIME
APP
USER
HOST
KEYWORD

No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

[Table 3] Entities of Interest

The CRF classifier from the Stanford NLP library [19] is used to create and train the model.
Tested on ten separately-sampled test data, the classifier tagged the interested entities with an
average accuracy of 0.9886. Table 4 shows the average performance per entity category.
Using a Conditional Random Field (CRF)-based statistical NER system to extract entities
has certain advantages over using pattern matching through regular expression. The CRF classifier
models the sequence of words, rather than individual words separately. Therefore, it recognizes
Entity Class
APP
HOST
KEYWORD
TIME
USER
Weighted Avg.

TP Rate
0.9853
0.9966
0.979
1
1
0.9886

FP Rate
0.01238
0.00073
0.00324
0
0
0.0055

Precision
0.9789
0.9966
0.9906
1
1
0.9886

Recall
0.9853
0.9966
0.979
1
1
0.9886

[Table 4] Feature Extraction Performance using Stanford NER
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F Measure
0.9821
0.9966
0.9848
1
1
0.9886

the patterns of words occurring around the entity we are interested in. This allows the classifier to
also recognize the entity by the patterns of the sequence containing it, even if the word itself does
not exactly match the pattern of training data.
For example, if the CRF classifier is trained to recognize the grey parts in Listing 7 as
application names, then with high chance it also recognize “SNMP event log extension agent” as
an application name in Listing 8 even if the log entry was not included in the training data.
The Windows Media Unicast Service started
The database engine 6.00.3940.0013 started
The File Server for Macintosh service was unable to contact a
domain controller
WMI ADAP was unable to process the PerfDisk performance library
due to a time violation in the open function

[Listing 7] CRF Classifier Training Log Entries

SNMP event log extension agent is starting

[Listing 8] CRF Classifier Test Log Entry
The Windows Media Unicast Service started
The database engine 6.00.3940.0013
Log
Type Classification

started

SNMPFile
event
log extension
agent service
is starting
The
Server
for Macintosh
was unable to contact a
domain controller [Listing 8] CRF Classifier Test Log Entry

Log type is a generic classification of log entry that indicates the purpose or logging level,

WMI ADAP was unable to process the PerfDisk performance library
to a time
violation
in the
function
such asdue
information,
error,
audit, warning,
etc. open
This can
be useful information for threat detection.

[Listing 7] CRF Classifier Training Log Entries

For example, we can have a hypothesis that if the number of error logs or alerts increases
significantly, then the system is not in a normal state. Two problems were found in the SKAION
dataset to determine log types reliably. First, some free text logs did not have this information at
all, whereas some structured logs contain log type as meta-data, such as Windows Event Type, or
Syslog Priority. Second, there is no standard way of labeling a log entry as one of the log types.
For example, Windows Event Type 1180 cannot be normalized as a category that is similar to a
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Syslog Priority level, error. Therefore, we cannot reliably interpret the real importance, or priority
based on the meta-data.
To overcome these problems, this study determines the log types from the log message
using an SVM classifier. 200 log entries were sampled from each of the different class (five attack
data and one background data) and manually labeled. Using the WEKA machine learning library
[8], the SVM model is trained. In a standard 10-fold test, an average of 98.5% log messages were
labeled correctly. (See Table 5)
Log Type Class
AUDIT
INFO
ERROR
WARN
ALERT
Weighted Avg.

TP Rate

FP Rate
0.998
0.971
0.833
1
0.984
0.985

0.013
0.007
0.003
0
0
0.007

Precision
0.986
0.966
0.938
1
1
0.985

[Table 5] Log Type Classification
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Recall
0.998
0.971
0.833
1
0.984
0.985

F Measure
0.992
0.968
0.882
1
0.992
0.985

Chapter 5. Performance Analysis

Tools, Libraries, and Programs
A custom-developed application written in Java, Generic Log Analyzer (GLA) is used to
perform all experiments described in this section. Figure 8 summarizes the data flow and
components of GLA, showing how the raw log files are processed, parsed, and sampled for the
training and testing of classifiers.

Log
Aggregator
Raw Log
Files

Meta-data,
Messages,
Features

Parser

Sampled Log
– Messages
Only

Sample
Generator

Sampled Log
– Features
Only

Cleaned,
Aggregated
Log Files

NER Model

Log Type
Classifier
Model

Classifier
Training &
Testing Utility

Sampled Log
– Messages
and Features

[Figure 8] Log Aggregation, Sampling, & Classification by GLA

[Figure 4] Log Aggregation, Sampling, & Classification by GLA
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Other than JavaSE-1.8, the following external libraries and tools were used in the various
stages of the experiment and analysis:


Stanford NER 3.5.22 (Command-Line Utilities, and Java-API)



WEKA v.3.6.133 (GUI, Command-Line Utilities, and Java-API)



R v. 3.2.04



Rattle v.3.4.15

Log Aggregation and Sampling
The collection of log data was pre-processed and aggregated into six different consolidated
log data files: one per attack scenario, and one background data without any successful attack.
Each line of the data file contains one log entry, including a text message and meta-data such as
the source file name, line number and message length. Each entry is also labeled with an attack ID.
The aggregated files are then parsed for feature extraction using NER and a log type classifier. The
models for the classifiers are trained separately, as described in Chapter 4.
To train and test the classifier, random samples of size ranging from 500 to 2000 were
selected from each attack type, and samples of the same size were selected from background data.
For example, a data file of sample size 500 contains 500 log samples from one of the attack types

2
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and 500 log samples from background traffic data. Table 6 shows the proportion of the sample size
to the population size.

Attack ID
4s1
4s3
4s4
4s13
4s14
b2 (background –
no attacks)

Population
Size
115242
112532
178895
146163
174450
149284

500
0.43%
0.44%
0.28%
0.34%
0.29%
0.33%

Sample Size
1000
1500
0.87%
1.30%
0.89%
1.33%
0.56%
0.84%
0.68%
1.03%
0.57%
0.86%
0.67%

2000
1.74%
1.78%
1.12%
1.37%
1.15%

1.00%

1.34%

[Table 6] Sample Size Proportion per Attack ID

The sampled logs are further processed into three different data sets:
1. Message-only data: contains a labeled free-text message from the log file. The
message is stripped of any string indicating time or date to remove the strong
correlation between the label and the time variable. This correlation is intuitive since
the log collection for a particular attack is a snapshot at a particular time during that
attack. However, we do not want the classifier model to fit to time/date strings.
2. Features-only data: contains the extracted features (user, application, host keywords)
and meta-data (message length, source system) without any original free-text message.
All features indicating time or file locations are removed for classification.
3. Message and Features data: contains the extracted features, meta-data, and free-text
messages. Both time/date strings within the message and the time variable extracted
from the messages are removed for classification.

28

Classifier Performance
In order to find the best performing classification algorithms for unstructured log analysis,
a number of experiments were conducted with 12 different classifiers from the WEKA library [8]
over 3 different types of datasets: message-only, features-only, and both message and features. To
evaluate performance, the following five statistics were used:
∑ 𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒+∑ 𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒 𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒



Accuracy =



Precision = ∑ 𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑑 𝑎𝑠 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒



Recall =



Specificity =



Time = elapsed time for training and 10 fold testing

∑ 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛

∑ 𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒

∑ 𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒
∑ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒

∑ 𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒 𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒
∑ 𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒

Recall and Specificity are negatively related. Therefore, there would be a trade-off if we
focused more on one of these two measures. On the other hand, accuracy and precision are
positively related. For our evaluation, we preferred classifiers with little variance among the four
performance indicators, since larger variance means that a good performance in one of these
measures may lead to a larger error in the other measure. Time represents the relative complexity
of the classification algorithm and does not show any relation to other performance indicators in
terms of evaluation of the classification algorithm. Therefore, a complex classification algorithm
that takes longer to build and classify does not necessarily perform better.
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Figure 9 and Table 7 show that the Naïve Bayes Multinomial (NBM), Voted Perceptron
(VP), and AD Tree (ADT) algorithms perform best for message-only data. These three algorithms
display high values of performance statistics with little variances among them. As expected, the
recall rate (red line) and specificity (black line) show a reverse correlation, while time (purple
dotted line) does not show any relation to performance.
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Average of trueNegativeRate(0)-specifity
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[Figure 9] Classifier Performance – Message-only
Classifier
BayesNet
NaiveBayes
NaiveBayesMultinomial
SMO (SVM)
VotedPerceptron
KStar
JRip
PART
ADTree
J48
RandomForest
RandomTree
Max
Min

Time (ms)
725.4
813.6
543.8
1862.2
491.2
24293.2
3704.8
2891.0
5567.0
1430.8
27013.4
718.8
27013.4
491.2

Rank
4
5
2
7
1
11
9
8
10
6
12
3

Avg. Perf
0.62718
0.60039
0.63933
0.65392
0.63341
0.63150
0.59777
0.62200
0.64516
0.62205
0.62290
0.61729
0.65392
0.59777

Rank
6
11
3
1
4
5
12
9
2
8
7
10

StdDev
0.13091
0.03925
0.02054
0.05622
0.02040
0.04439
0.02825
0.02898
0.04379
0.04701
0.04183
0.07722
0.13091
0.02040

[Table 7] Performance Ranking – Message-only data
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Rank
12
5
2
10
1
8
3
4
7
9
6
11

For features-only data, (Figure 10) Bayes Net (BN), Random Forest (RF) and Random
Tree (RT) show strong performance. Average time for training and testing is significantly less
when we use feature only data than when data is classified with free-text messages. Free-text
messages generally yield a large number of feature sets with counts of 120-160 after attribute
selection in 1000 sample entries, whereas features-only data has 12-18 attributes after the selection.
Both the NBM and VP algorithms which performed well for message-only data, can handle only
numerical data and therefore, was not tested for features-only or message-and-features data, as
they contain a large amount of categorical data.
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[Figure 5] Classifier Performance - Features Only Data
BayesNet
NaiveBayes
SMO (SVM)
KStar
JRip
PART
ADTree
J48
RandomForest
RandomTree
Max
Min

Time (ms)
107.2
126.2
2822.4
3612.2
543.2
583.4
629.8
126
3870.6
127.8
3870.6
107.2

Rank
1
2
5
10
6
7
8
4
9
1

Avg. Perf
0.64849
0.65033
0.63909
0.63727
0.63344
0.64291
0.64610
0.64247
0.67660
0.66212
0.67660
0.63344

Rank
4
3
8
9
10
6
5
7
1
2

StdDev
0.01826
0.02408
0.02987
0.03228
0.00580
0.03508
0.09681
0.01552
0.01549
0.00130
0.09681
0.00130

[Table 8] Performance Ranking – Features-only
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Rank
5
6
7
8
2
9
10
4
3
1

For data with both messages and extracted features (Figure 11 and Table 9), tree-based
algorithms such as Random Tree (RT), J48 Tree (J48), and Random Forest (RF), performed better
than others. Generally, classifiers performed best on this type of dataset. As shown in Table 9, the
maximum performance reached 0.7054 for this dataset, compared to 0.6766 and 0. 6539 for
feature-only and message-only datasets, respectably. On the other hand, the classification of these
data sets took an average of 19.6% longer than classifying message-only data and 140% longer
than features-only data.
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[Figure 6] Classifier Performance – Message-and-Features

BayesNet
NaiveBayes
SMO (SVM)
KStar
JRip
PART
ADTree
J48
RandomForest
RandomTree
Max
Min

Avg Time
(ms)
782.2
694.2
4263.0
28340.2
4290.2
5553.4
6819.0
1086.2
18604.0
678.8
28340.2
678.8

Rank
3
2
5
10
6
7
8
4
9
1

Avg. Perf
0.65171
0.61956
0.66904
0.65139
0.65369
0.67764
0.70541
0.68278
0.69942
0.67972
0.70541
0.61956

Rank
8
10
6
9
7
5
1
3
2
4

StdDev
0.03867
0.01812
0.03409
0.04034
0.03319
0.02622
0.16163
0.00805
0.01480
0.00274
0.16163
0.00274

[Table 9] Performance Ranking – Message-and-Features
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Rank
8
4
7
9
6
5
10
2
3
1

Performance by Sample Size
If the size of training data increases, would the classification performance increase as well?
To answer this question, we ran the classification with four different sample sizes: 500, 1000, 1500,
and 2000. It should be noted that the sample size refers to the number of log entries from each
attack type, and the same number from background data. That means the 4s1 attack type data with
sample size 500 contains 1000 log samples, half of which is from 4s1 and the other half from b1
(background data). Experimental data contained both message and extracted features. The Random
Tree classifier was used with an Information Gain attribute selection of threshold value 0 (only
features with a positive IG were selected).
Figure 12 displays the average performance for all five attack types. Generally, the
performance statistics increase from 500 to 1500, but fall at 2000 in average data. The reason for
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[Figure 7] Performance by Sample Size, Avg. of 5 attack types
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time in ms

6000

0.7500

the degradation at 2000 is not clear. The cause could be that the classifiers reached their maximum
predictive power on a given dataset between 1500 and 2000, or that the WEKA software reached
its maximum capacity in handling larger data. Time, shown in the purple line, seems to increase
exponentially. The four performance measures show different trends for each attack type, as shown
in Figures 13-18. The general trend of decrease at 2000 is consistent, except in 4s4, which
increased slightly at 2000 (Figure 15). The variance among the performance measures decrease as
sample size increases with the exception of 4s14. 4s14 shows the lowest level of variance at 500
and fluctuations as the sample size increases (Figure 17).
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[Figure 15] 4s4
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[Figure 17] 4s14

Performance Gain by Feature Extraction
Feature extraction is the process through which we can attain more obscure information
from unstructured logs. With the techniques described in Chapter 4, we extracted relevant
information from free-text messages, such as the application name, host, user name, time, and
keywords (Section 4.2). We also determined if the log message was an audit log, error log,
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[Figure 18] Performance by Data Type
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information, warning or alert (Section 4.3). Using these features with the unstructured message
generally seemed to increase the classification performance as shown in Section 5.2 and 5.3. In
this section, we will more closely examine the performance gain achieved by feature extraction.
In order to compare the best performers among different data types, we selected only the
classifiers that performed best for specific data types: NBM and VT for message-only data, RT
and RF for feature-only data, and J48 and RT for the data with both message and features. We
used a sample size of 1500 which gave the best measures in previous experiments (Section 5.4).
For all data types, we used TF-IDF measures and IG attribute selection as it is shown to improve
performance (Sections 3.2 and 3.3). Figure 18 shows the average performance of the two classifiers
for each data type. As expected, using both a message and features still achieved the highest rate
of accuracy, recall, specificity and precision. Figure 19 details the differences between pairs of
data types. Compared with message-only data, data with both a message and features gained an
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[Figure 19] Performance Gain by Feature Extraction
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average of 6.82% accuracy, 8.49% recall, 2.86% precision, and 5.30% specificity. This is a 23.5%
cumulative gain. However, this gain in performance came with the cost of time. As shown in
Figure 20, the data set with both features and messages took approximately 95% longer to build a
model and perform a 10-fold test with 3000 log entries. The values for features-only data in Figure
21 is biased because one of the algorithms used for the data type was RF, which usually takes
about 10 times longer than other algorithms when used on other data types. Figure 20 shows the
distribution excluding the time for RF, which is more comparable to other data types. The featuresonly data contains only 19 to 33 attributes, allowing it to run much faster than other data types
with which the number of attributes range from 261 to 320. As shown in Figure 20, features-only
data shows a large improvement from message-only data and takes only a fraction of the time.
This is an important characteristic to consider for real-time analytics.
In the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curves in Figure 22, the curve for the data
type with both messages and features (red) exhibits the largest area under the curve, signifying a
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stronger predictive power. The features-only data type (blue) is next, while the message-only data
type (purple) has the smallest ROC area.

message

features

both

1
0.9
0.8
0.7

TP

0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
0

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.6

0.7

0.8

FP

[Figure 22] ROC Curve by Data Types
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Chapter 6. Summary and Discussions

Summary
From the experiments described in Chapter 3, 4 and 5 we know the following factors affect
classification performance for unstructured log analysis:
1) A classification algorithm’s performance is significantly affected by the nature of the
data preparation. If the prepared data contains only free-text log messages, algorithms
such as NBM or VT work well. If the data contains categorical features or is a mixture
of features and free-text messages, RT or RF show a robust performance. (Section 5.3)
2) Generally, the size of the training data is positively related to the classification
performance, until a peak is reached. This peak observed in the SKAION dataset is
between sample sizes of 1500 and 2000 for binary classification. (Section 5.4)
3) Identifying, extracting, and using features such as the application name, host name, IP
addresses, user name, and keywords from the unstructured log messages increased the
classification performance by 2.8-8.5%. (Section 5.5)
4) Using extracted features only, we can improve the classification performance by 0.935.21%, and decrease time by 87%. These are useful characteristics in real-time
analytics (Section 5.5)
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5) An attribute selection algorithm based on Information Gain or the chi-squared test
increased the average precision by 2.5% but decreased the average recall by 3.0%. This
also reduced time for training and testing by 63%. (Section 3.3)
6) TF-IDF transformation of the free-text messages has a small but positive impact if it is
used with the attribute selection algorithm. (Section 3.2)

Discussion
Through this study, we discovered many factors that affect unstructured log analysis using
machine learning. Still, the results raise some questions: Is a 70-73% predictive performance
sufficient for security threat detection? Is a 2.8-8.5% performance gain worth the time and effort
of feature extraction? Is the performance peak with the training data size shown in Section 5.4
artificial or natural? We will discuss these questions in detail in this section.
1) Is a 70-73% predictive performance enough for security threat detection?
It is difficult to find a reliable SIEM benchmark for security threat detection, primarily
because SIEM is primarily used as a log collection and archiving tool as stated in Chapter 1. The
most common benchmarking metric for SIEM is Event Per Second (EPS), which indicates how
many logs the system can handle per second [38]. Since the availability of the KDD99 dataset in
1999 [35], more benchmarking studies have been done on network-based security detection
through the Intrusion Detection/Prevention System (IDS/IPS). [34, 36, 37]. Lippmann et al. found
18% of attacks were completely missed by a signature-based Network-based Intrusion Detection
System (NIDS) [34]. A more recent study with the same dataset reports detection rates ranging
from 5.4 to 99.4%, suggesting network-based IDS performs well for certain security threats, but
had little success on others [38]. This is because NIDS relies solely on network traffic analysis and
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has little insight into the events occurring locally within a computer or non-network based attacks
such as email phishing or misconfiguration. On the other hand, SIEM can handle information from
almost any system, application, or connected device. Considering we achieved a 70-73%
prediction using unchartered information within free-text data for a very diverse range of systems,
it would not be a large stretch to assume that this approach has even more potential. With further
studies on intelligent correlation with the NIDS alerts, email filter logs, or a configuration
management system, the overall detection performance could improve significantly.
2) Is a 2.8-8.5% gain in performance worth the time and effort of going through feature extraction?
Many statistical analytics experts in the marketing area agree that using non-traditional
data sources such as social networks improved their predictions by 0.5-1.5% [39]. When analytics
have reached their maximum predictive potential with the existing data and techniques, adding
more data to gain another 1 or 2% could be a potential a competitive edge. Therefore, the 23.5%
of cumulative performance gain is not negligible. For our purposes, however, there are two more
important benefits of feature extraction, beyond the gain in performance metrics:
a. As described in (4) in Section 6.1, using features alone, we have better prediction than
message-only data and decreased the time by 87%. This opens up the possibility of realtime unstructured log analysis using classifiers with a continuous learning capability.
b. The extracted features are important keys for the normalization of log messages and the
analysis of the relationships between log entries. This may allow us to further improve the
detection rate.
3) Is the performance peak with the training data size shown in Section 5.4 a natural limit for data?
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In Section 5.4, we observed that a peak was reached at 1500 for most attack types. If this
is the natural limit for this type of data, adding more training data would not improve performance.
However, if this limitation is imposed by the software or hardware, then by using infrastructure
specialized for Big Data analytics, we may further improve the classification performance. Further
work is necessary to answer this question, because there currently seem to be no general rules or
guidelines on this subject. The relationship between training data size and performance appears to
be highly dependent on the specific dataset being studied [7, 26].
In general, performance analysis indicates a good potential for further studies. The
performance test results as well as the techniques described in this study should be useful
information to design more sophisticated feature extraction methodologies and algorithms that are
specialized in log classification for threat detection.
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Chapter 7. Conclusions

This study systematically explores the possibility of utilizing techniques for text
classification, natural language processing, and machine learning in mining unstructured log
messages for the purposes of security threat detection. A number of experiments were conducted
on simulated attack data from SKAION datasets. In order to extract the relevant information from
the unstructured message, named entity recognition and generic text classification were used. The
extracted information was preprocessed into three different formats: free-text messages, extracted
features, and both messages and features. Through a number of experiments, the best classification
performance metrics (70-73%) were achieved on data including both free-text messages and
extracted features by using the Random Tree and J48 Tree algorithms along with TF-IDF
transformation and IG attribute selection. Using features only, we also achieved a similar 68-71%
performance metric, but in only 5.3% of the time duration. Therefore, feature extraction and text
classification of unstructured log messages demonstrate high potential for real-time log analysis
using machine learning in SIEM data. Moreover, the methods used this this study produces
encouraging results for

further studies on automatic log normalization, intelligent feature

extraction and entity relationship analysis using Big Data analytics.
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for security threat detection, the complexity and volume make it very difficult for even
most trained analysts to find the right information. While the conventional security event
management tools fall short in terms of utility and cost-effectiveness, this research explores
a new paradigm in security event analysis using natural language processing, statistical
pattern recognition, machine learning and Big Data analytics. The aim is to increase
accuracy, sensitivity and specificity of the security tools and to make log analysis fast
enough for real-time processing.
Security Risk Quantification - no more "High/Medium/Low." After decades of intensive
investment and specialization, it is about the time that we have the meaningful and concise
numerical representation of the security risk. This research aims to come up with a set of
numbers that objectively represent various aspects of information security risk arising from
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the underlying technologies. Much like ROI or ROE in the financial accounting, these
security indices can be tracked, compared, and analyzed providing essential information in
decision making.
Awards/Scholarship


2nd Place, Poster Science and Engineering, Graduate and Professional Student
Association Research Forum, University of Nevada, Las Vegas, 2015



GPSA Graduate Research Sponsorship Award, University of Nevada, Las Vegas, 2015



University of Toronto Scholar’s Award, 2000, 2001, 2002

Posters/Presentations


“Risk Prioritization of Network Vulnerabilities” Computer and Information Science
(ICIS), 2015 IEEE/ACIS 14th International Conference, Las Vegas, 2015



“Quantifying security risk by measuring network risk conditions” GPSA Annual
Research Forum, University of Nevada, Las Vegas, 2015



“Attack Simulation based on Network Vulnerability Risk” Howard R. Hughes College of
Engineering Graduate Poster Competition, University of Nevada, Las Vegas, 2015

Industrial/Consulting Positions


Principal Consultant, CSL Security Consulting Co., 2014-Current
Developed a series of security questionnaires (740+ questions) for all levels of workforce,
in order to evaluate the efforts required to migrate to NERC CIP v.5 standards for a large
power generation client; Developed and documented IT Security roadmap for three year
horizon, discussing the risk management, IT governance, required technical controls, and
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capital/operating cost projection; Established Information Security Programs by selecting
security frameworks (ISO/IEC 27001/2), developing policies, standards, and procedures,
and obtaining approvals from the senior management


IT Security Manager, Liberty Algonquin Business Services, 2013-2014
Developed and documented IT Security roadmap for three year horizon, focusing on
technology risk management and capital/operating cost projection; Presented IT Security
roadmap to IT Steering Committee, securing 100% budget approval and senior
management support; Established 3-rd party 24/7 monitoring of network security events
with 3rd party SOC; Developed a comprehensive corporate-wide information security
program based on ISO27001/2 standards; Supported annual financial and SOX audit by
interfacing with external auditors and internal business units; Co-drafted the privacy policy
compliant with the different privacy regulations of 9 U.S. states and provinces.



Manager, Network and Security Services, AESI Acumen Engineering Solutions
International Inc., 2011-2013
Developed Smart Grid Cyber Security Master Plan enabling the client to win the DoE’s
Smart Grid Stimulus Grant; executed the plan by implementing network segregation, SIEM,
AAA, Firewall and PKI. Conducted security risk assessment, vulnerability assessments,
and security reviews for all new devices and applications commissioned for the Smart Grid;
Developed on-going security programs for the risk management, identity and access
management, patch management, vulnerability management, and security incident
handling; Conducted Security Gap Assessment and Benchmarking Analysis for a large
power utility company; Conducted SCADA security assessment for a large power company
and benchmarked their security posture against 14 comparable entities. Conducted gap
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analysis and program maturity assessment based on Electricity Sector Cyber Security
Capability Maturity Model issued by DoE; Collaborated in development of risk-based
assessment methodology for identifying critical assets and critical cyber asset for MontanaAlberta 230Kv Tie-Line project; Developed an ICS (Industrial Control System) Security
Framework for the city transportation commission operating subway, bus, and light railway
system


Senior IT Security Specialist, Hydro One Networks Inc., 2008-2011
Provided consulting to various business units in developing and maintaining the procedural
and technical controls for NERC CIP, Bill 198, ISO/IEC 27001/2 and NIST 800; Initiated
and ran security programs for information/system security, regulatory compliance, risk
management, and business continuity; Conducted periodic/ad-hoc IT security reviews and
reported results with metrics and recommendations; Provided project management support
for various security projects; Implemented a Compliance Management System for
regulatory compliance for transmission and distribution operation.



Systems Engineer/Officer – Transmission Operating Tools, Hydro One Networks
Inc., 2004-2008
Provided day-to-day support for main computer system for power grid operation;
Responded to trouble calls and provided 2nd-level support for SCADA, ICCP, and FEP
components; Participated as the SCADA SME in Cyber Security Compliance Project, EMS
Software Upgrade, Control Room Hardware Refresh, and Backup Control Center
Activation.



Assistant Systems Engineer/Officer - Operations Tools & Facilities, Hydro One
Networks Inc., 2002-2004
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Developed real-time power system applications to increase the productivity and
operational accuracy in the Control Room, using Java, C++, J2EE, JMS and JRE
technologies (i.e. Automatic Capacitor Switching, Multiple Tap Changer Control, ICCP
Hold-offs, Historical Data Web-reporting, One-click Control Room Information System);
Enabled real-time data exchange with 25+ market participants (IESO, OPG, NYPA, and
other electricity distributors), by initiating, implementing, supporting, and troubleshooting
ICCP communication channels; Enhanced system availability for the in-house developed
power system applications, by creating configurable, transparent, automatic logging and
security frameworks, using Java, C++, JRE, JMS, JAAS, and AOP technologies
Professional Certifications/Memberships


Member of American Gas Association Cyber Security Task Force 2013



Certified Information System Auditor (CISA) 2012



Certified Information System Security Professional (CISSP) 2009



GIAC Security Essentials Certification (GSEC) 2009

Interests


Safe and Secure Online: Volunteering to help children learn how to protect themselves
online



Golf, Hiking, Kendo
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